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Policy makers have a variety of instruments at their disposal when pursuing emissions reduc-
tion objectives. Traditionally, regulators have relied upon “command and control” (CAC)
approaches involving prescriptive emissions or pollution control technology standards. In-
creasingly, however, emissions trading programs are the preferred policy choice. In the
United States, the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAAs) of 1990 initiated a monumental
shift away from CAC regulation towards more market-based alternatives such as emissions
trading.1 In Europe, the European Union’s greenhouse gas Emission Trading System has
brought emissions trading to the fore.
Despite this prominence, questions remain about how emissions trading is working in
practice. First, can these market-based programs reduce emissions beyond what could be
achieved with more prescriptive CAC regulation? An important perceived advantage of
market-based approaches over CAC is that they can, in some circumstances, deliver more
signiﬁcant public health and environmental beneﬁts; lower compliance costs and greater com-
pliance ﬂexibility make more stringent emissions reductions politically feasible (Keohane et
al., 1998; Ellerman, 2006; Tietenberg, 2006; US EPA, 1992). Although this hypothesis seems
plausible, it has been diﬃcult to test empirically (Ellerman, 2003; Harrington and Morgen-
stern, 2007; Stavins, 1998; Tietenberg, 2006). Second, some have expressed concern that a
reliance on permit markets (versus prescriptive regulations and standards) to coordinate pol-
1The CAAAs authorized the use of economic incentive regulation for the control of acid rain, the devel-
opment of cleaner burning gasoline, the reduction of toxic air emissions, and for states to use in controlling
carbon monoxide and urban ozone.
1lution abatement activity can lead to environmental injustice (Kaswan, 2008; Vandenbergh
and Ackerly, 2007). If polluting facilities can achieve compliance by purchasing permits (ver-
sus reducing emissions), there is the possibility that permitted pollution will ﬂow into areas
where poor or minority populations live. To the extent that there are pre-existing inequalities
in the distribution of environmental risks, these inequalities can be exacerbated.2
We assess these questions in the context of a renowned emissions market: the REgional
Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM). Our primary objective is to identify the causal
eﬀects of this emissions trading program on facility-level emissions vis a vis the CAC regula-
tions it replaced. Our essential challenge is to construct a credible benchmark; a precise and
believable estimate of the emissions we would have observed in the absence of the program.
Design features unique to the RECLAIM facilitate the construction of this counterfactual.
More speciﬁcally, we can exploit the fact that only a subset of industrial facilities located
in non-attainment counties in California were removed from a CAC regime and required to
participate in RECLAIM.
The RECLAIM program marked many ﬁrsts for emissions trading. Speciﬁcally, it was
the ﬁrst mandatory trading program to supplant a pre-existing CAC regime that was, in
theory, capable of achieving the same environmental objectives. It was the ﬁrst program to
include a broad and diverse population of sources, making it particularly relevant to future
trading programs that will need to be more heterogeneous to achieve increasingly aggressive
air quality and climate goals. Illaudably, it was also the ﬁrst emissions trading program to
2Although a broad literature examines environmental justice concerns with plant citing, CAC regulation
and neighborhood location choices (see Banzhaf and Walsh 2008), few papers assess the environmental justice
eﬀects of emissions trading.
2be challenged on the grounds of environmental injustice and noncompliance.
This analysis of the RECLAIM program is motivated by three observations. First, a
recent resurgence of interest in RECLAIM makes our study both timely and appropriate.
Cap-and-trade programs ﬁgure prominently in regional and federal proposals for addressing
climate change, thus drawing increased attention to past experiences with market-based
instruments in general, and RECLAIM in particular. Recent attempts to extract constructive
insights from the RECLAIM experience arrive at very diﬀerent conclusions. Whereas some
regard the program as a clear success (Stavins, 2007), others see a “spectacular” failure
(Green et al., 2007).3
Second, axiomatic questions about the eﬀectiveness in reducing pollution of market-based
programs relative to more traditional CAC regulations remain controversial and unresolved.
Compared to the previous literature addressing these questions (see, for example, Harring-
ton and Morgenstern, 2007), we take a fundamentally diﬀerent approach.4 We exploit the
participation requirements of the RECLAIM program in order to construct semi-parametric
estimates of program impacts. Emissions trajectories at RECLAIM facilities are compared
3Stavins (2007) summarizes domestic experience with emissions trading and reports that the RECLAIM
program has generated signiﬁcant environmental beneﬁts “with NOx emissions in the regulated area falling
by 60 percent.” Green et al. (2007) discuss the relative strengths and weaknesses of greenhouse gas emissions
trading relative to a carbon tax. While reﬂecting upon past experiences with the former approach, they note
that: “additional pitfalls and dilemmas of emissions trading can be seen through a review of the spectacular
trading failure of the RECLAIM.” They go on to argue that although “SCAQMD estimated that SO2 and
NOx would be reduced by fourteen and eighty tons per day, respectively,...RECLAIM never came close to
operating as predicted.”
4Both Stavins (1998) and Ellerman (2003) note that, in the context of comprehensive cap-and-trade
programs such as the Acid Rain Program, it has been diﬃcult (if not impossible) to construct credible
estimates of the emissions that would have been observed under a diﬀerent regulatory regime. Harrington
et al. (2004) compare outcomes from controlling similar pollutants in the United States and Europe using
diﬀerent policy instruments. The limitation of this approach is that diﬀerences in outcomes across the
two contexts likely reﬂect social, cultural, political, and economic diﬀerences, in addition to diﬀerences in
regulatory regimes.
3with those at similar California facilities outside of RECLAIM. One important advantage
of this approach is that it generates counterfactual emissions estimates that are free of the
potentially confounding eﬀects of changing economic conditions at the state-level, industry-
wide production trends, and technological change.
Finally, our empirical framework facilitates an analysis of how RECLAIM-induced changes
in emissions are distributed across communities with diﬀerent socio-economic characteristics.
For a number of reasons, the RECLAIM market has been the most criticized of any emis-
sions trading program with respect to environmental justice concerns. Some contend that
RECLAIM has placed a disproportionate burden of the region’s air pollution in low-income,
minority communities (Drury et al., 1999; Moore, 2004). We combine semi-parametric
matching methods with parametric regression techniques. This allows us to examine cor-
relations between RECLAIM-induced emissions changes and socio-economic neighborhood
characteristics with unprecedented precision.
Our results indicate that emissions at RECLAIM facilities have fallen by more than
20 percent, on average, relative to the control facilities (i.e. similar California facilities
subject to command and control regulation). These results are generally robust to alternative
estimation methods, functional form speciﬁcations, and diﬀerent control group composition.
We fail to reject the hypothesis that pollution reductions under RECLAIM were equally
distributed across neighborhoods with diﬀerent socio-economic characteristics.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background on Southern California’s
RECLAIM program, emphasizing past experiences with program evaluation and environ-
4mental justice issues in particular. Section 3 describes the research design and econometric
approach. Section 4 summarizes the data. Section 5 presents the empirical ﬁndings. Section
6c o n c l u d e s .
2 Background on RECLAIM
In this section, we introduce Southern California’s RECLAIM program and provide some
background on two areas of emphasis: measurement of the emissions impacts of RECLAIM
and related environmental justice concerns.
2.1 A Brief History of the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market
Los Angeles suﬀers from some of the worst air quality in the nation.5 The South Coast Air
Quality Management District (SCAQMD)is the government agency responsible for regulat-
ing air pollution in the Los Angeles basin.6 In 1989, SCAQMD introduced an aggressive set
of rules and standards for stationary sources. Industry representatives ﬁercely opposed these
rules on the grounds that compliance costs would prove excessive.
In 1990, Congress turned its attention to the widespread failure of US cities to attain
health-based national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS). Under the 1990 CAAAs, Fed-
eral NOx standards were signiﬁcantly revised. Because SCAQMD was much further from
5Air pollution problems are due in part to meteorological and topographical conditions; the basin is sunny,
warm, and poorly ventilated. The dense population, large number of vehicles, and high levels of industrial
activity also contribute signiﬁcantly to the problem. In 1988, ozone levels in the Los Angeles air basin
exceeded state standards on 148 days (California Air Resources Board air quality data statistics accessed
may 15, 2008. http://www.arb.ca.gov/adam/php_ﬁles/aqdphp/sc8start.php). Estimates of health-related
losses due to the poor environmental quality in the region were approaching $10 billion per year (Hall et al.,
1992).
6Figure 1 shows the district’s boundaries.
5attainment compared to other air basins, the district was given more time to comply. Al-
though required reductions in ozone concentration levels were larger for the Los Angeles basin
compared to other non-attainment areas in California, the required rates of concentration
reductions over time were quite similar.7
The CAAAs also provided general authorization for states to use market-based regulatory
programs to achieve federal standards. Market-based approaches to pollution regulation were
endorsed on the grounds that so-called “command-and-control” approaches were insuﬃcient
to address the worst of the nation’s air quality problems, and that market-based approaches
oﬀered a “historic opportunity to help reconcile the nation’s economic and environmental
aspirations.” (US EPA, 1992). While the use of economic incentives to achieve air quality
standards was discretionary in most cases, it was required in extreme non-attainment areas,
i.e., Los Angeles.8
SCAQMD responded by replacing over 40 prescriptive rules, which had been so opposed
by industry, with a market-based emissions trading program: RECLAIM.9 This program
was approved by state and federal regulators on the grounds that it would deliver emissions
reductions equivalent to—or greater than—what would have been achieved under the subsumed
command-and-control provisions, and would help to bring the region into compliance with
federal standards by the 2010 deadline.
7Appendix A discusses the CAAA compliance requirements in more detail.
8Pursuant to Sections 182 and 187, the US EPA issued a ﬁnal rule and guidance on Economic Incentive
Programs (40, part 51, Subpart U) which outlined requirements for establishing EIPs. States or governing
bodies in extreme ozone nonattainment areas were required to design and implement economic incentive
programs (51.492,182(g)5).
9Although both NOx and SO2 emissions are capped under the program, the emphasis was on limiting
NOx emissions which are an important precursor to ozone formation.
6At its inception, RECLAIM included 392 facilities whose combined NOx emissions ac-
counted for over 65% of the region’s stationary NOx emissions (Schubert and Zerlauth, 1999).
Almost all facilities in the SCAQMD with annual NOx or SO2 emissions of four tons or more
are included in the program.10 Public facilities (such as police and ﬁre ﬁghting facilities)
were categorically excluded. Sources emitting less than four tons per year remained subject
to command-and-control programs.11
A RECLAIM trading credit (RTC) confers the right to emit one pound of emissions
within a twelve month period.12 Figure 2 plots the aggregate allocation trajectory over time
(the red line).13 NOx emissions permitted under RECLAIM were reduced by over 70 percent
over the ﬁrst ten years of the program. By the end of 2003, the aggregate permit allocation
reached the level of emissions that the subsumed rules and control measures were intended
to achieve by 2010.
Early on, most ﬁrms found they had an excess of credits (the blue line in Figure 2
represents aggregate tons of NOx emissions).14 The aggregate cap did not start to bind until
10Of these, 73% of these can be classiﬁed as manufacturing ﬁrms, 13% are involved in communication,
transportation or utilities, 2% are involved in construction, 3% are operating in the service sector, 6% in
wholesale trade, 2% are retail establishments, and the remaining 3% can be classiﬁed as government facilities.
11Facilities could “opt-in” to the program. Facilities could not opt-out.
12RTCs cannot be banked; a permit can only be used to certify emissions occurring within the twelve
month period with which the permit is associated. For emissions in any quarter, ﬁrms can use either permits
expiring in June or in December. Holland and Moore (2008) analyze this “overlapping cycles” feature of the
permits.
13SCAQMD maintains a detailed database tracking all NOx permits and quarterly, facility-level emissions.
RTC price data were obtained from Evolution Markets LLC. Section 4 includes a detailed description of these
data.
14Nonetheless, RECLAIM may have changed ﬁrms’ production and investment decisions in this early
period. A ﬁrm making a long-lived investment may have abated early in anticipation of higher future
prices. Furthermore, RECLAIM relaxed a vintage diﬀerentiated regulation, New Source Review, that has
limited ﬁrms abilities to modify facilities (Keohane et al. (forthcoming) discuss this literature). Under CAC,
operating permits are generally valid for several years unless modiﬁcations trigger New Source Review (NSR),
which can be contentious and costly. Under RECLAIM, traditional NSR regulations were replaced. There
71999 (SCAQMD, 2001). The ﬁgure helps to illustrates this “cross-over” point. While it is
clear that emissions permits were initially over-allocated, many believe that generous permit
allocations in the early years of the program were necessary to engender political support
for the program (US EPA, 2002). Because permits cannot be banked, impacts of the initial
over-allocation were conﬁned to the early stages of RECLAIM.
Figure 2 also plots the trend in average RTC prices (the green line). In the ﬁrst ﬁve
years of the program, prices for NOx RTCs remained relatively low, as expected.15 How-
ever, the increase in prices following the cross-over was much larger than anticipated; the
price of NOx RTCs increased from approximately $2000 per ton in January of 2000 to over
$120,000 per ton in March of 2001. During the California electricity crisis, many generators
without retroﬁtted NOx reduction equipment were required to run and hence exceeded their
allocations signiﬁcantly.16 I nM a y2 0 0 1 ,t h eR E C L A I Mr u l e sw e r ea m e n d e dt or e d u c et h e
RTC demand from power producing facilities and to stabilize the sharply increasing NOx
RTC prices. The rule amendments (Rule 2009) isolated fourteen power producers from the
rest of the RECLAIM market. These facilities were not allowed to trade RTC’s. Instead,
is some evidence that RECLAIM’s internal NSR procedure may have facilitated NSR for the RECLAIM
facilities. For example, only “BACT” is required and necessary oﬀs e t sc a nb ed e m o n s t r a t e dw i t hR T C s .
Furthermore, the RECLAIM annual reports show a very high rate of NSR activity. From 1994 to 2006,
the reports show that on average forty-seven RECLAIM facilities had NSR activity per year. In contrast,
Committee (2006) report that on average 125 NSR permits per year were issued for the entire country from
1997 to 2002 for NOx.
15Before RECLAIM began, it was predicted that trading in the market would be slow at ﬁrst because of
the initial surplus of permits. In 1994, SCAQMD economists predicted that prices for NOx RTCs would
average around $577/ton in 1995 and rise to approximately $1,100/ton by 1999 (Miller, Michael (1994).
“Firms Can Earn Credits for Keeping Emissions Down, Then Sell Them.” The San Francisco Examiner.
January 9, 1994: B1).
16Kolstad and Wolak (2003) provide evidence that some electricity producers in SCAQMD intentionally
purchased NOx RTCs at higher than competitive prices so as to be able to artiﬁcially increase electricity
prices.
8they were required to oﬀset excess emissions at a price of $14,000 per ton. In addition, these
facilities were required to submit plans to install the “best available” control technologies on
all existing power generating units by the end of 2004.17
By 2002, monthly average prices had fallen below $2000 per ton NOx.R e g u l a t o r sw e r e
concerned that low permit prices were failing to provide suﬃcient incentives for facilities to
install pollution control technologies that would be needed to bring the region into compliance
with federal standards. In September of 2004, restrictions on power producers were made
more stringent and the aggregate RTC allocation for compliance years 2007-2011 was reduced
by an additional 20 percent.
2.2 RECLAIM Program Evaluation
Because RECLAIM represented such a major departure from the traditional regulatory ap-
proach, both federal and state agencies have required an unprecedented level of program
evaluation and oversight. In general, emissions trading program evaluation has proven to be
particularly challenging (Ellerman, 2003; Stavins, 1998; Tietenberg, 2006). Because indus-
trial emissions are inﬂuenced by numerous factors, attributing changes in emissions patterns
to speciﬁc policy interventions is diﬃcult. These challenges notwithstanding, agencies in
charge of overseeing RECLAIM remain committed to evaluating the emissions impacts of
the program.
Unresolved disagreements about what constitutes an appropriate measure of counter-
factual emissions has resulted in a plurality of opinions regarding RECLAIM’s overall per-
17For more information see SCAQMD (2007).
9formance. Appendix B summarizes some of the contradictory evidence provided by past
program evaluations and reports. After ﬁfteen years of program evaluations, the emissions
impacts of RECLAIM vis a vis the subsumed CAC rules remain controversial.18 Federal
policy makers and other stakeholders have expressed frustration over the lack of consensus
emerging from RECLAIM program evaluations, noting that the public is entitled to “real
world information and practical comparisons in order to judge for itself whether the program
is living up to their needs and expectations” (US EPA, 2002). Disagreements surrounding
counterfactual emissions beget disagreements about the overall success of the RECLAIM
program. The proverbial jury is still out.
2.3 Environmental Justice and Emissions Trading
The term “environmental injustice” refers to any disproportionate human health or environ-
mental impact on minority or low income populations (EO 12898, 1994). Empirical research
conducted in the 1980s demonstrated signiﬁcantly higher levels of exposure to environmental
hazards in traditionally disadvantaged communities.19 Subsequent work has brought more
sophisticated empirical methods to bear on this issue (Banzhaf and Walsh, 2008). A recent
review of the literature concludes that the evidence is mixed (Shapiro, 2005).
Environmental justice advocates have historically opposed market-based approaches to
environmental protection (Bansal and Davis, 1998; Drury et al., 1999). Kaswan (2008)
18Some studies have constructed counterfactual estimates using ex ante expectations about economic
trends and the control factors for subsumed rules (SCAQMD, Various years). Critics contend that this fails
to account for unanticipated economic conditions or technological changes that aﬀect emissions patterns with
or without emissions trading. Other studies have tried to adjust ex ante predictions using ex post observed
emissions trends (US EPA, 2001). This approach likely confounds exogenous and endogenous changes in
emissions. See Appendix B for further discussion of these regulatory studies.
19See, for example, Brown, 1995; GAO, 1983; US EPA, 1992.
10provides a detailed discussion of the perceived tensions between environmental justice and
emissions trading. The most common criticism is that emissions trading programs fail to
account for the distribution of pollution damages whereas permitting under the CAAAs
can explicitly consider environmental justice concerns. If polluting facilities can purchase
permits instead of reducing emissions, it is possible for pollution concentrations to ﬂow
into areas where poor or minority populations live, thereby exacerbating any pre-existing
inequalities in the distribution of environmental risks. On the other hand, market-based
programs could mitigate pre-existing environmental justice problems. If relatively dirty
facilities with low marginal abatement costs are disproportionately located in traditionally
disadvantaged neighborhoods, a well functioning permit market should ensure that a larger
share of the mandated emissions reductions will be achieved in these areas (Burtraw et al.,
2005).20
For a number of reasons, the RECLAIM market has been the most criticized of any
emissions trading program with respect to environmental justice issues (Chinn, 1999; Drury
et al., 1999; Moore, 2004). First, the Los Angeles area is home to an exceptionally diverse
population. Past studies have documented that race and ethnicity have historically played
a “persistent explanatory role” in explaining the distribution of environmental health risks
in Southern California (Morello-Frosch et al., 2001). Second, NOx is a non-uniformly mixed
pollutant. Damages from NOx emissions can vary signiﬁcantly across space.21 Finally, the
20An EPA analysis of outcomes under other the Acid Rain Program ﬁnds no evidence of disproportionately
adverse impacts on minority or low-income populations (EPA, 2005). A more recent paper ﬁnds that minority
groups receive a disproportionate share of the net beneﬁts from the program (Shadbegian et al., 2007).
21In the interest of avoiding “hotspots”, RECLAIM was designed as a zonal trading system. The SCAQMD
was divided into two zones: the region along the coast, and an inland region. Facilities along the coast (where
11RECLAIM program was indirectly implicated in another highly controversial rule promul-
gated by SCAQMD that allowed stationary sources to oﬀset their uncontrolled emissions of
volatile organic compounds (VOCs) using mobile source emissions reduction credits.22 Al-
though RECLAIM was only indirectly involved in this high proﬁle controversy, the program
has since been associated with environmental injustice.23
3 Research design
Previous estimates of the emissions eﬀects of RECLAIM are conditional on, and highly sen-
sitive to, controversial assumptions about what emissions would have been in the absence of
the program. In this study, we exploit some unique design features of the RECLAIM program
in order to construct more tenable and transparent estimates of counterfactual emissions.
Rather than rely on ex ante expectations about what aggregate emissions trajectories would
have been absent RECLAIM, we use econometrically adjusted ex post observed emissions at
facilities that were subject to CAC regulation over the same time period. In what follows,
we introduce our empirical framework and identiﬁcation strategy.
pollution problems tend to be more severe) may only purchase RTCs from other coastal facilities. Inland
facilities can purchase permits from either inland or coastal facilities.
22This rule was challenged by a coalition of environmental groups on the grounds that it violated Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act; the rule allowed reductions in mobile source emissions (whose eﬀects are arguably
distributed widely across the region) to be substituted for VOC reductions at point sources located in
minority communities. The lawsuit was withdrawn by the plaintiﬀst w ow e e k sa f t e rt h ec a s ew a sﬁled. See
“CBE Sues SCAQMD Over Amendments to Car Scrapping Rule”, California Environmental Insider: 12 (7),
Sept. 15, 1998.
23The RECLAIM program, as it was originally designed, permitted the use of mobile source credits to
achieve compliance. This mobile source credit compliance option was rarely used. Mobile source credits
represented less than 0.02% of the total allocation of NOx permits.
123.1 Empirical framework
Building on the potential outcome framework that is now standard in the program evaluation
literature (see Holland, 1986 for a survey), we assume that there are two regulatory states to
which the California’s industrial NOx emitters could have been assigned: the market-based
RECLAIM program or the CAC regime that prevails in non-attainment counties outside
of SCAQMD (and which the SCAQMD continues to use to regulate smaller emitters). Let
Di =1if the ith facility is in RECLAIM (i.e., the facility is “treated”). Let Di =0if
facility i remains subject to CAC regulation throughout the duration of our study. Potential
outcomes Yit(1)a n dYit(0) denote annual emissions at facility i at time t conditional on
participation and non-participation, respectively.
We are primarily interested in estimating the average treatment eﬀect on the treated
(ATT):
αTT = E[Yit0(1) − Yit0(0) | Di =1 ] , (1)
where t0 represents any year following the introduction of the RECLAIM program and αTT
measures the average eﬀect of the RECLAIM program on annual facility level NOx emis-
sions.24
Emissions at both treated and untreated facilities are observed prior to the RECLAIM
program (i.e., when all facilities in California’s non-attainment areas were subject to CAC
regulation) and over several years following the introduction of the program. Facility-level
emissions data collected from RECLAIM participants during years following the introduction
24We will also evaluate program impacts in percentage terms, although we will emphasize [1] as a more
informative measure of the overall eﬀect of RECLAIM on industry emissions.
13of the program can be used to identify E[Yit0(1)|Di =1 ] . Note that [Yit0(0)|Di =1 ]is
unobservable.
The RECLAIM program applies only to major sources located within SCAQMD (see Fig-
ure 1). Thousands of California facilities located outside the Los Angeles air basin are sub-
ject to more traditional CAC. Furthermore, hundreds of smaller emitters within SCAQMD
remain subject to more traditional CAC rules. These incomplete program participation re-
quirements provide us with a potential comparison group. We use econometrically adjusted
emissions outcomes of these non-participants to estimate the unobserved potential outcomes.
The simplest and most naive estimate of αTT is obtained using an unconditional diﬀerences-
in-diﬀerences estimator. This estimator may be biased if variables that are related to facility-
level emissions dynamics vary signiﬁcantly across the treatment and comparison groups. In
order to reduce the bias potentially introduced by observable diﬀerences across RECLAIM
participants and non-participants, we will condition on observable covariates.
3.1.1 Regression-based conditioning strategies
Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators can be used to control for factors other than regula-
tory regime that aﬀect facility-level emissions trajectories. We estimate the following simple
speciﬁcation:
Yi1 − Yi0 = β
0Xi + αDi + εi, (2)
where Xi is a vector of observable covariates that vary across observations. This implic-
itly assumes that the variables in X are exogenous to treatment status. In our case, these
variables will include facility level emissions observed prior to the introduction of the RE-
14CLAIM program, industry classiﬁcation, county-level attainment status, and pre-determined
zip code-level economic and demographic indicators. The parameter α captures the average
eﬀect of the RECLAIM program on changes in facility-level emissions over time conditional
on variables in X. The error term εi is assumed to be independent of the covariates in Xi
and the treatment indicator Di.
There are several potential problems with this approach. First, if there are regions of
the covariate space where there is only limited overlap in the distributions of X across the
treatment and control groups, the imputed missing outcomes will rely heavily on extrapo-
lation. If functional form assumptions are incorrect, estimates may be biased. Estimates
of average treatment eﬀects can also be biased if control observations are not appropriately
reweighted to control for diﬀerences in the distribution of the X variables over regions com-
mon to the control and treatment groups. In the interest of mitigating these biases, we turn
to semi-parametric matching estimators.
3.1.2 Semi-parametric conditioning strategies
Matching estimators, which are used extensively in non-experimental program evaluation,
are an extension of standard regression approaches. Our general approach follows Heckman
et al. (1997, 1998) who introduce the following generalized DID matching estimator:
d αDID =
1
N1
X
j I1
{(Yj1(1) − Yj0(0)) −
X
k I0
wjk(Yk1(0) − Yk0(0))}. (3)
Here, I1 denotes the set of program participants, I0 denotes the set of nonparticipants, and
N1 is the number of facilities in the treatment group.25 The participants are indexed by j;
25This assumes a common support which we explore in the next section.
15the non-participants are indexed by k. The weight placed on individual k when constructing
the counterfactual estimate for treated facility j is wjk.D i ﬀerent DID matching estimators
adopt diﬀerent approaches to deﬁning the weights wjk used to scale the contribution of each
non-participant. In general, when the observable characteristics, Xi,o fa nu n t r e a t e du n i t
k are closer to the characteristics of a treated facility j (relative to other facilities in the
control group), the untreated unit k is weighted relatively more heavily in the construction
of a counterfactual estimate for unit j. In what follows, we will be emphasizing a nearest
neighbor estimator and a propensity score-based reweighting estimator.
One clear advantage of matching estimators over standard linear regression techniques
is that they eschew parametric assumptions about the relationship between the outcome
variable and the covariates in X.26 Additionally, whereas treatment eﬀect heterogeneity may
bias OLS estimates of average treatment eﬀects, non-parametric matching estimators are
unbiased because they impose no restrictions on individual treatment eﬀects.
3.2 Identifying assumptions
Our most important identifying assumption is that the biases in the unconditional DID
estimates can be removed by adjusting for diﬀerences in observable covariates. More formally,
we assume that the distribution of the control outcome Yit0(0), conditional on observable
facility and county characteristics (such as historic emissions, industry classiﬁcation, county
attainment status), is the same among participating and non-participating facilities. If this
26Smith and Todd (2005) compare results of matching and regression estimates using the same set of
covariates and demonstrate that avoiding functional form assumptions can be important in reducing bias.
However, if the true outcome equation is linear as in (2), failing to impose linearity will reduce the eﬃciency
of our estimates.
16unconfoundedness assumption is satisﬁed, once we adjust for observable diﬀerences, we can
interpret diﬀerences in observed outcomes as the eﬀect of RECLAIM versus the CAC regimes
of other California air basins.
In order to interpret [3] as an estimate of the eﬀect of RECLAIM vis a vis the CAC
r e g u l a t i o nt h a tw o u l dh a v ep r e v a i l e di nt h eS C A Q M Da b s e n tR E C L A I M ,i tm u s tb et h e
case that the emissions trajectories of RECLAIM facilities and the matched control facil-
ities would have followed parallel trajectories absent RECLAIM. This implies a somewhat
stronger version of the unconfoundedness assumption: trends in the stringency of the control
treatment (i.e., the CAC regulations to which the control facilities are subjected) follow the
trajectory that the SCAQMD CAC regime would have taken absent RECLAIM.
Our estimation strategy also requires that the support of the distribution of the condi-
tioning covariates in the treatment group overlaps the support of the distribution of these
covariates in the comparison group. Finally, in order to rule out spillovers and general equilib-
rium eﬀects, it must also be the case that potential outcomes at one facility are independent
of the treatment status of other facilities.
Some of these assumptions and identifying conditions can be directly tested. For instance,
it is straightforward to demonstrate that the overlap condition is satisﬁed by simply looking
at the joint distributions of the covariates in the treated and control groups. Other assump-
tions pose more of a challenge. Most importantly, unconfoundedness is not directly testable
in principle. However, we are able to conduct indirect tests. The weaker unconfoundedness
assumption implies that Yit0(0) will be distributed similarly within sub-populations that are
17homogeneous in observable covariates. As we have two diﬀerent control groups (i.e., facilities
located within SCAQMD exempt from RECLAIM, and similar facilities located outside the
SCAQMD), we can test whether the assumption holds across the two control groups.
The stronger unconfoundedness assumption requires that the control treatment resembles
the regulations that RECLAIM facilities would have been subjected to absent RECLAIM.
In Appendix A, we assess the plausibility of this assumption by looking at the ozone con-
centrations reductions mandated in SCAQMD vis a vis other California air basins over the
study period.
3.3 Treatment eﬀect heterogeneity
In addition to identifying the average eﬀect of RECLAIM on facility-level emissions, we are
interested in investigating whether treatment eﬀects appear to vary systematically across
facilities located in neighborhoods with diﬀerent socio-economic characteristics. Standard
DID matching estimators discard potentially useful information about the joint distribution
of the outcome variable Yit and the covariates in X that is unrelated to the treatment
indicator Di. We combine matching with parametric regression so as to investigate what
this discarded information can tell us about how treatment eﬀects vary with observable
neighborhood characteristics.
All of the matching estimators we use can be interpreted as nonparametric weighted
regression equations that weight treatment eﬀects according to the proportion of treated
facilities associated with each value of X. We specify a weighted regression model that
allows the treatment eﬀect to vary systematically with a subset of variables in Xi (denoted
18Zi):
Yi1 − Yi0 = β
0Xi + αDi + θ
0ZiDi + εi (4)
To investigate the extent to which emissions trading has exacerbated (or mitigated)
environmental injustice vis a vis CAC regulations, we deﬁne Zi as historic emissions, zip
code median income, and zip code percent minority. As a robustness check, we extend Zi to
include measures of regulatory variables, macroeconomic shocks, and industry ﬁxed eﬀects
(see Appendix C).
4D a t a
About 10,000 polluting facilities in California report emissions of criteria pollutants to the
California Air Resources Board (ARB). All polluting facilities are required to report to their
local Air Quality Management District; the ARB maintains a database of emissions reports
from the local districts. Our primary data comes from this database which also includes
information on industry classiﬁcation beginning in 1990. We use addresses, geocodes, and
industry classiﬁcations to ensure a consistent coding of facilities across our panel.27 We also
use separate emissions data from RECLAIM to verify the emissions reported to the ARB
database.28
In the regressions, we use zip code level demographics data from the year 2000 Census
27To ensure consistent coding over time, we identify facilities with diﬀerent ID’s but the same address and
SIC. If the facilities do not report emissions in more than one overlapping year, then we code the facilities
with the same ID. To ensure consistent coding within a year, we combine facilities with diﬀerent ID’s but
t h es a m eg e o c o d e sa n dS I C .
28Details available upon request. The data from RECLAIM were obtained under a public records request
and included information on allocations and quarterly emissions.
19Summary File 3.29 The data include median household income in 1999 (variable p53) and
population by ethnicity and race (variable p7). We construct a measure of percent minority
as the percent of the zip code’s total population that is either non-Hispanic black or Hispanic.
See Figure 1 for the spatial distribution of this measure.
Figure 3 shows the declining trends in total NOx emissions at California facilities between
1990 and 2005. The ﬁgure illustrates that, in the aggregate, NOx emissions from both
facilities in RECLAIM and those in comparison groups were declining at similar rates prior
to the introduction of RECLAIM. In the early years of the RECLAIM program (i.e., when the
aggregate cap was not binding) emissions of RECLAIM facilities appear to increase slightly
relative to facilities outside the program. After the cross-over point in 2000, however, the
average rate of emissions decrease among RECLAIM facilities exceeds that of non-RECLAIM
facilities. Overall, emissions among RECLAIM facilities have dropped 72 percent relative to
pre-1993 levels, whereas emissions among non-participating facilities have dropped only 62
percent over the same period.
Table 1 summarizes a balanced sample of these same data. To construct this table, the
data are partitioned into four non-overlapping periods. Period 1 encompasses years prior to
the introduction of the RECLAIM program (i.e., 1990-1993). Period 2 covers the early years
of the RECLAIM program when the emissions cap exceeded aggregate emissions (1997-98).
Period 3 includes years immediately following the “cross-over” point (2001-02). Period four
includes the most recent years for which emissions data are available (2004-2005). The sample
includes all facilities reporting positive emissions in each period. Overall, annual facility-level
29See http://factﬁnder.census.gov decennial census data sets.
20emissions are signiﬁcantly larger among RECLAIM ﬁrms vis a vis the comparison group.
Average emissions among RECLAIM facilities fell 70 percent between period 1 and period
4. We will subsequently refer to these unadjusted diﬀerences as “baseline” measures of the
average eﬀect of RECLAIM on facility-level emissions.30 This table also illustrates that
annual emissions are distributed diﬀerently across RECLAIM facilities and others in all
periods.
Table 2 examines the distributions of treated and control facilities within the eight in-
dustries which accounted for the largest shares of NOx emissions in Period 1. While reﬁning
and electricity generation are the largest polluters, about 40% of emissions are from ﬁrms in
other four-digit SIC codes. Regarding the distributions of the treatment and control groups,
there are several points worth noting. First, the industry-speciﬁcm e a n so ft h eR E C L A I M
facilities are not always larger. In fact, for seven of these eight industries, the RECLAIM
facilities are smaller on average than the control facilities in the same industry. Second, the
common support assumption is satisﬁed for most of these eight industries in the sense that
the intervals containing the minimums and maximums of the distributions are overlapping.31
Third, the table suggests a word of caution about our matching strategy. Ideally we would
like to match each treated facility with a large number of control facilities to average out
idiosyncratic shocks in our estimate of counterfactual emissions. However, the number of
control facilities within each industry suggest that some industries have a limited number of
30When the sample is limited to just those facilities who were in compliance with RECLAIM over the
entire study period, average emissions fell from 72.2 to 31.5 (a similar percentage reduction).
31Of the fourteen relevant minimum or maximum comparisons, eleven are satisﬁed. Note that this is rather
a weak test, since it may be driven by outliers. Ideally, we would like suﬃcient density over the common
support.
21potential controls.32
Our panel of facility-level data is unbalanced. Of those facilities reporting emissions after
the RECLAIM program was introduced, only 60 (45) percent of RECLAIM ﬁrms and 32 (13)
percent of control facilities report emissions in the ﬁrst three (four) periods. Facility-level
emissions data in a given period may be missing for a number of reasons, including ﬁrm
entry and exit, errors in the data, or simply a facility’s failure to report emissions in a given
period. On average, treated facilities reporting emissions in all periods were larger emitters
in period 1, although not signiﬁcantly so.33 Section 5 discusses sample selection issues in
more detail.
I nT a b l e3 ,w ec a l c u l a t et h ec h a n g ei nt o n so fN O xe m i s s i o n se x p o s u r ep e rc a p i t a .W e
use census tract data from 2000 to determine the number of people within a demographic
group who live in a tract whose centroid is within 1/2, 1 and 2 miles of each facility.34
For each demographic group, we aggregate the change in emissions across people in that
group and facilities and then normalize by the group’s total population in the LA area. The
ﬁrst three columns report the actual change in emissions from period 2 to period 3. We
ﬁnd that all groups experienced a reduction of emissions.35 Within a 1/2 mile, the group
that saw the largest actual reductions was high income Asians while the group that saw
32A limited number of controls may lead to poor match quality. We discuss match quality below.
33Among RECLAIM participants, average period 1 emissions are 101.8 tons and 95.0 tons for “balanced”
facilities (i.e., those facilities reporting emissions in all four periods) and unbalanced facilities, respectively.
Among the control group, these averages are 87.8 tons and 52.9 tons, respectively.
34This technique is similar in spirit to Banzhaf and Walsh (2008) but is more closely related to earlier
techniques used in the environmental justice literature.
35Standard errors are computed by assuming the facility-level changes in emissions are iid. Simple T-tests
ﬁnd that most groups within 0.5 miles had statistically signiﬁcant reductions in emissions from period 2 to
period 3.
22the smallest reductions was middle income Asians. These results change depending on the
distance from facilities. In section 5, we look at the relative changes in emissions, namely
the actual changes less the changes from our counterfactual control group, that we attribute
to RECLAIM trading.
5R e s u l t s
In this section, we present estimates of treatment eﬀects for the long-term view of the program
as well as for the window surrounding the price spike when we expect to see emissions
reductions from RECLAIM. The estimates are broadly similar across our three estimators
and are subjected to several falsiﬁcation tests. We then present estimates of heterogeneous
treatment eﬀects and environmental justice and discuss selection issues.
5.1 Diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimates
Table 4 summarizes our main results. The control group is restricted to facilities located in
counties that, during 1990 and 1993, were not in attainment with the 1-hour ozone NAAQS
standards. The columns on the right pertain to diﬀerences constructed using facility-level
annual emissions data. The columns on the left construct diﬀerences using log transformed
values. The top panel (Panel A) presents a more long term view of program impacts;
facility-level emissions in period 4 are subtracted from period 1 emissions. Panel B compares
facility-level emissions immediately before and after the emissions cap began to bind in
aggregate. Recall that some electricity generators did not comply with RECLAIM when
permit prices spiked in period 3. We thus exclude these electricity producers from this period
232-3 comparison so as to focus on those facilities that were participating in (and complying
with) the cap-and-trade program.
We use a simple linear regression framework to generate DID estimates that condition on
observable facility characteristics that are that are likely to be correlated with unobservable
determinants of emissions. Covariates include industry ﬁxed eﬀects and NOx emissions in
period 1. Conditional on the identifying assumptions of this linear regression model, we
ﬁnd that RECLAIM program eﬀects on emissions changes over period 1 to 4 are highly
signiﬁcant. Emissions changes immediately following the cross over period (from period 2
to 3) are also statistically signiﬁcant in logs. The period 1 NOx coeﬃcient (not reported) is
statistically signiﬁcant and negative in all speciﬁcations, indicating that historic emissions
are a good predictor of emissions in later years.
5.2 Semi-parametric matching
Within the class of matching estimators, there are a variety of matching algorithms to choose
from. Asymptotically, all matching estimators produce the same estimate. However, in ﬁnite
samples, diﬀerent matching estimators can yield very diﬀerent treatment eﬀect estimates,
particularly if one or more of the identifying assumptions is violated (Morgan and Harding,
2006). In this section, we present results using two semi-parametric matching estimators: a
bias adjusted “nearest neighbor” estimator and the so-called “double robust” estimator.
Nearest neighbor matching
The non-parametric nearest neighbor (NN) matching estimator constructs the counter-
factual estimate for each treatment case using the control cases that most closely resemble
24the treatment cases. If m nearest neighbors are selected for each program participant, the
wjk are set equal to 1/m for the selected neighbors and zero for all other members of the
comparison group.36 We impose a strict overlap condition; only those control facilities in
t h es a m ei n d u s t r i e sa sR E C L A I Mf a c i l i t i e sa r ei n c l u d e di nt h ep o o lo fp o t e n t i a lc o n t r o l s .
Following Abadie and Imbens (2006), we augment our covariate matching estimation with a
regression-based bias adjustment so as to eliminate bias introduced by poor match quality.
After matching the treated facilities with m nearest neighbors, within pair diﬀerences are
bias-adjusted using a parametric regression of the control outcome on X.37
Table 4 presents these nearest-neighbor estimates. Matching covariates include pre-
treatment (i.e.,p e r i o d1 )N O x emissions, four-digit SIC code, and county attainment status.
These variables are likely to be correlated with unobservable determinants of facility-level
emissions, including production technology characteristics, ﬁrm size, demand for the prod-
ucts produced by the facility. Matching is exact on the categorical variables. Standard error
estimates are constructed using the variance formula of Abadie and Imbens (2006). Leave-
one-out cross-validation methods are used to select the neighbor parameter m.A p p e n d i x
tables A1 and A3 demonstrate that our results are not overly sensitive to the choice of m or
the bias adjustment.
36Although a larger m reduces the expected variance of the estimate because more information is used to
construct the counterfactual for each participant, a large m also increases the bias of the estimate as the
probability of making poorer matches increases. One drawback of this estimator is that all “neighbors” are
equally weighted, regardless of their distance from the treated facility. The bias of this estimator is of order
N1/z,w h e r ez is the number of covariates in X.
37More speciﬁcally, using data from matched control facilities, we regress the dependent variable (i.e.,
diﬀerences in emissions) on the covariates. We then use this regression model to impute counterfactual
estimates for all treated facilities. Note that these estimates are not likely to be sensitive to our parametric
assumptions because regression techniques are only used to impute diﬀerences in outcomes among very
similar facilities. These bias adjustments are discussed in more detail in Appendix C.
25When the overall change in emissions between the pre-treatment period (period 1) and
period 4 is used as the dependent variable, the NN estimate, -17.79 tons per year, is statis-
tically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level. This is approximately 17 percent of the average
annual emissions at RECLAIM ﬁrms in period 1. Using log-transformed emissions data,
the estimated coeﬃcient is -0.25, implying that emissions reductions declined (in percent-
age terms) by approximately 25 percent more, on average, among RECLAIM ﬁrms versus
matched control facilities. Because the estimated average annual percentage reduction is
somewhat larger than the estimated average reduction (in levels) expressed as a percent-
age of period 1 emissions, this suggests that percentage reductions are somewhat larger at
smaller ﬁrms.
Making the period 3 period 2 comparison, the NN estimate is -9.42 and statistically
signiﬁcant. This represents 13 percent of the average annual emissions at RECLAIM ﬁrms
in period 2. The SATT estimate estimated using log transformed data is 0.26.
Propensity score matching
Since the seminal work of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), there has been considerable
interest in methods that avoid adjusting directly for observable covariates and instead adjust
for diﬀerences in the propensity score (i.e., the conditional probability of treatment). An
important result in the literature is that, if unconfoundedness holds, conditioning only on
the propensity score assures independence of Di and Yi(0). Recent work has demonstrated
that, when there is good overlap in the distribution of propensity scores for treated and
control units, reweighting estimators outperform nearest neighbor or kernel matching in
26ﬁnite samples (Busso et al., 2009). In our case, all treated observations receive a weight of
one, whereas control observations receive a weight
e p
1−e p (where b p is the estimated propensity
score).
The propensity score equation describes the process by which the data are ﬁltered or
selected to produce the observed sample. The process that determined whether a facility
located inside or outside of SCAQMD is not directly observed. Consequently, the propen-
sity score is an unobserved statistical object that needs to be estimated. We estimate the
propensity scores using a reduced form probit model. Explanatory variables include industry
aﬃliation, historic emissions, and squared historic emissions. We enforce a common support.
Balance is achieved and there is signiﬁcant overlap in the propensity scores of the treatment
and comparison groups
Although matching on propensity scores balances treatment and controls across the set
of covariates, facilities with very similar propensity scores may have diﬀerent combinations
of observable characteristics. In our case, we ﬁnd that matching on p-scores does not always
imply a close match on observables (even after adding higher order terms to the selection
equation). This poor match quality can introduce bias. Consequently, we use a propensity
score based reﬁnement of weighted regression: the so-called “double robust” (DR) estimator
(Robins et al.,1995; Robins and Ritov, 1997). By combining propensity score matching with
regression, we can reduce bias introduced by poor match quality.38 Table 4 summarizes the
main results. These SATT estimates are larger in absolute value as compared to the NN
38This double robust estimator will not always constitute an improvement upon the more standard para-
metric regression approach. Reweighting of observations will only add noise if the parametric regression
model is correctly speciﬁed (Freedman and Berk, 2008).
27estimates and somewhat noisier.
Robustness of semi-parametric matching estimates
Our empirical results indicate that emissions reported by facilities in the RECLAIM
program fell by signiﬁcantly more over the ﬁfteen year study period (i.e., 1990-2005) as
compared to emissions reported by a group of California facilities located in non-attainment
counties, operating in the same industries, with similar pre-RECLAIM emissions levels.
When we narrow our focus to the window of time surrounding the cross-over point (i.e.,
the point at which the aggregate cap began to bind), we continue to ﬁnd that emissions
reductions among RECLAIM ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly greater on average as compared to the
matched controls. In order to interpret these estimates as an unbiased measure of RECLAIM
program impacts, some important assumptions must hold. We investigate the plausibility
of these assumptions here.
First, our analysis is predicated on the assumption that the emissions trajectories of
ﬁrms in the control group are representative of the emissions trajectories that would have
been observed at similar RECLAIM facilities had RECLAIM not been implemented. Put
diﬀerently, we assume that facilities with the same observed covariates should follow parallel
emissions trajectories if they are subject to CAC regulation in a non-attainment county.
Discontinuities in RECLAIM participation requirements allow us to indirectly test this un-
confoundedness assumption. We do this by means of a false experiment. We redeﬁne our
“treated” group to be facilities in the SCAQMD but not regulated by RECLAIM. Our pool
of control facilities consists of facilities located in non-attainment areas other than the South
28Coast. If unconfoundedness holds, the estimated “treatment eﬀects” in this false experiment
should not be statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Table 5 summarizes the results from this experiment. We ﬁnd that the change in the aver-
age emissions (in levels) among these facilities located in SCAQMD that remained subject to
more prescriptive forms of emissions regulation is not statistically diﬀerent from that of the
control group. Put diﬀerently, the emissions trajectories among smaller SCAQMD facilities
exempt from RECLAIM and the emissions at similar facilities located in other California air
basins follow parallel paths. This is consistent with our unconfoundedness assumption.
Diﬀerences in percentage changes in emissions (i.e., the estimates obtained using log-
transformed emissions data) tell a somewhat diﬀerent story. In the more long run compar-
ison, estimated eﬀects of being located in SCAQMD (yet exempt from RECLAIM) versus
located in another California non-attainment area are negative and substantially smaller in
absolute value than the estimates reported in panel A. The double robust estimate is statis-
tically signiﬁcant, suggesting that the percentage reduction in emissions observed over this
ten year period was larger among low-emitting ﬁrms subject to SCAQMD CAC regulation
as compared to small emitters located in other non-attainment areas of California. We ﬁnd
the reverse is true in the period 2-period 3 comparison. In sum, although results using
untransformed data generally support the unconfoundedness assumption, results generated
using log-transformed data are less clear
One might also be concerned that, in response to the introduction of the RECLAIM
program, production and associated emissions moved from RECLAIM facilities to those
29exempt from the program. This would bias upwards our counterfactual emissions estimates,
and exaggerate our estimates of program impacts. To investigate this issue, we experiment
with using diﬀerent subsets of the control group to identify the sample average treatment
eﬀect. In one exercise, we exempt Los Angeles facilities from the control group. In another
exercise we include only Northern California facilities. Table 6 summarizes these results.
Our point estimates are not substantially impacted. Our nearest neighbor estimates remain
highly statistically signiﬁcant. Our double robust estimates are quite noisy, in part due to
the smaller sample size, and are harder to statistically distinguish from zero.
The ﬁnal row of table 6 report SATT estimates obtained using only data from facilities
in severe (versus moderate) non-attainment areas as controls. Estimated program eﬀects are
substantially larger in absolute value. This result is consistent with the idea that the politi-
cal palatability of emissions trading programs vis a vis CAC regulations makes it feasible to
introduce more aggressive environmental standards. In the early 1990s, California counties
that had historically suﬀered from more severe air quality problems had more strict regula-
tions in place (Figure A1). In these counties, industrial stakeholders would presumably have
be more resistant to the introduction of more stringent emissions regulations, as compared
to facilities in regions where the marginal costs of air quality improvements was relatively
l o w .I ft h i sw e r et h ec a s e ,w ew o u l de x p e c tt h a tt h ee ﬀects of market-based regulations (in
terms of emissions reductions achieved) would be greater when comparisons are made against
counties facing similar (versus less) political opposition to increased regulatory stringency.
305.3 Environmental justice
The literature on environmental justice is concerned that polluters in poor or minority neigh-
borhoods may have been able to avoid reducing emissions by purchasing permits (Bansal,
1998). In this section, we ask whether trading resulted in changes in emissions that are
correlated with the demographics of the polluters location. From Tables 5 and 6, we con-
clude that emissions reductions were signiﬁcantly greater among facilities in the RECLAIM
program relative to the CAC counterfactual we construct. We now investigate whether these
RECLAIM program impacts were more or less felt by traditionally disadvantaged neighbor-
hoods in the SCAQMD.
In Tables 7 and 8, we use non-parametric matching methods to construct a counterfactual
change in emissions for each regulated (and compliant) facility and then regress the diﬀerence
between the actual change and the predicted change on a number of covariates measuring
environmental justice. We present results from several alternative speciﬁcations for both the
overall eﬀects of the program. Table 7 presents results from the period 2 and 3 comparison;
Table 8 investigates the period 1 to 4 comparison. Results are generated using both nearest
neighbor and propensity score matching. The results are qualitatively similar.
Speciﬁcation 1 includes only a treatment dummy, period 1 NOx emissions, and an inter-
action between these two covariates as explanatory variables. This speciﬁcation is similar to
the linear regression equation introduced in section 5.1, although less restrictive because it
includes group (versus industry) ﬁxed eﬀects and allows the Period 1 NOx coeﬃcient to vary
across the treatment and control group. The Treat * Period 1 NOx coeﬃcient is statistically
31signiﬁcant. Conditional on group ﬁxed eﬀects and the P e r i o d1N O xvariable, this is the
eﬀect of historic emissions on the change in emissions at RECLAIM facilities relative to that
eﬀect for all ﬁrms. For example, in Panel A of Table 7, the coeﬃcient of -0.06 implies that for
each additional ton that a facility emitted in period 1, it reduced emissions between periods
2 and 3 by an additional 0.06 tons relative to the control group.
Speciﬁcations (2) through (7) include income and race covariates. Speciﬁcation (7) in-
cludes historic NOx emissions and all demographic variables. In this speciﬁcation, neither
median income nor percent minority are statistically signiﬁcant predictors of the changes in
emissions in RECLAIM. The same is true within the control group; neither income nor race
are signiﬁcant determinants of changes in emissions. The change in emissions per capita
reported in Table 3 show similar ﬁndings. For both the actual change in emissions as well as
the relative change (the diﬀerence between the actual change and the change for the control
group), emissions fall for almost all demographic groups. Furthermore, the changes do not
have a clear pattern based on income or race.
In all speciﬁcations containing Treat * Period 1 NOx, the variable is statistically signiﬁ-
cant, indicating larger emissions reductions at larger facilities. Appendix Figure A3 helps to
illustrate this relationship between changes in emissions and historic emissions both for RE-
CLAIM and other facilities in more detail. As with Table 7, we use the e N sample resulting
from Table 5.39 In Figure A3, we smooth the observations, separately for RECLAIM and for
39In particular, we use the results from the top row, period 1 to 4, m =3 . For each treated observation,
we construct a measure of what the change in emissions would have been for the control group if the control
group had the same historic emissions as the treated observation. This is done by using bias adjustments
developed by Abadie and Imbens (2006) to mitigate bias introduced by poor match quality. We use a
quadratic ﬁt (see Appendix C).
32other facilities, using a k-Nearest Neighbor estimator. We see that the relationship between
historic emissions and change in emissions is decreasing over the range of zero to 80 tons per
year of historic emissions. In contrast, the control group is relatively ﬂat at zero for most of
the range: from zero to 55 tons that accounts for over 80% of the sample.
In all speciﬁcations, the Period 1 NOx coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant. Ideally, our
within group matching on historic NOx emissions would be perfect and the Period 1 NOx
coeﬃc i e n tw o u l dn o tb ei d e n t i ﬁed. In fact, our data are not suﬃciently rich to facilitate
perfect matching; historic emissions do vary within a group of matched facilities. Moreover,
we ﬁnd that this within-group variation in historic emissions is signiﬁcantly correlated with
the dependent variable. In light of these results, we are concerned about bias introduced by
poor match quality. All of our matching estimation incorporates a parametric adjustment
to mitigate this bias (Abadie and Imbens, 2006).
Appendix C explores the robustness of the results presented in Table 7. The results
are robust to including noncompliant facilities and to the inclusion of other variables like
regulatory variables, macroeconomic shocks, and industry ﬁxed eﬀects (Table A4). The
demographic variables are not signiﬁcant if subsets of the demographic variables are excluded
(Table A3).
5.4 Selection issues
We are also concerned about the unbalanced nature of our panel. In order to interpret our
results as a measure of the average eﬀect of the RECLAIMprogram on facility-level emissions,
the subset of facilities reporting emissions should be representative of the populations of
33RECLAIM and control facilities, respectively. The group of facilities reporting emissions
changes over our sample period. Non-random selection into the data could imply that our
estimates of the average program impacts among the population of RECLAIM facilities may
be biased. Intuitively the direction of selection bias, were it present, is unclear. One might
be concerned that facilities with relatively high abatement costs would be more likely to exit
a CAC regime that oﬀers less compliance ﬂexibility. This would result in inﬂated estimates
of RECLAIM program impacts vis a vis the CAC counterfactual. On the other hand, if
a market based approach does make more stringent emissions reductions more politically
feasible, we might expect to see facilities with relatively high abatement costs exiting the
SCAQMD with higher frequency, biasing our results in the opposite direction.
One common approach to addressing sample selection issues involves augmenting the
outcome equation with an inverse Mills ratio estimated using a parametric selection model
(Heckman, 1979). We use a probit model to represent the selection process. When we include
facility-speciﬁc inverse Mills ratios as an additional explanatory variable in our parametric
regressions, the estimated coeﬃcient on this ratio is not statistically signiﬁcant. Although
this suggests that selection bias does not contaminate our estimates, we report these results
with some important caveats. First, there are no variables included in the selection equation
that can be credibly excluded from the outcome equation. Moreover, we oﬀer no intuitive
motivation for the parametric assumptions underlying our model of the selection process.
Another approach to assessing whether the unobserved factors that drive the selection
process are biasing our results is to investigate whether our results change signiﬁcantly if we
34generate our results using only those units that are observed over the entire sample. Our
estimates of program impacts over the full time period, and in the late (post cross-over)
period are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, we exploit some unique design features of the RECLAIM program in order
to bring new and illuminating evidence to bear on two important questions. First, did
emissions reductions at facilities subject to Southern California’s RECLAIM exceed emis-
sions reductions achieved at very similar facilities subject to CAC regulation over the same
time period? Second, has the compliance ﬂexibility aﬀorded by market-based environmental
regulation resulted in more (or less) pollution in traditionally disadvantaged communities?
Our results indicate that emissions at RECLAIM facilities fell approximately 20 percent,
on average, relative to the control facilities. However, during the period of great permit price
volatility, several facilities did not comply with the regulation. When these facilities are in-
cluded in our analysis, we ﬁnd that RECLAIM did not reduce emissions relative to command
and control during this volatile time. For those complying, emissions fell signiﬁcantly more
at large facilities, as is consistent with scale economies in abatement technology. We ﬁnd no
evidence that neighborhood demographic characteristics were insigniﬁcant determinants of
their changes in emissions.
35References
[1] Abadie, Alberto and Guido W. Imbens. 2006. “Large Sample Properties of Matching
Estimators for Average Treatment Eﬀects.” Econometrica, 74(1): 235-267.
[2] Bansal, Shipra and Sam Davis. 1998. “Holding our Breath: Environmental Injustice
Exposed in Southeast Los Angeles,” pp. 17-28.
[3] Banzhaf, H. Spencer and Randall P. Walsh. 2008. “Do People Vote with their Feet?
An Empirical Test of Tiebout/s Mechanism,” American Economic Review 98(3), pp.
843-63.
[4] Brown, Phillip. 1995. “Race, Class and Environmental Health: A Review and System-
atization of the Literature.” Environmental Research 69 (1): 15-30.
[5] Burtraw, Dallas, David A. Evans, Alan Krupnick, Karen Palmer, and Russell Toth.
2005. “Economics of Pollution Trading for SO2 and NOx,” Annual Review of Environ-
ment and Resources, 30: 253-289.
[6] Busso, Matias, DiNardo, John E. and McCrary, Justin. 2009. "New Evidence on the
Finite Sample Properties of Propensity Score Matching and Reweighting Estimators."
IZA Discussion Paper No. 3998.
[7] Chinn, Lily. 1999. “Can the Market be Fair and Eﬃcient? An Environmental Justice
Critique of Emissions Trading.” Ecology Law Quarterly, 26(1): 89-125.
[8] Committee on Changes in New Source Review Programs for Stationary Sources of Air
Pollution. 2006. New Source Review for Stationary Sources of Air Pollution The Na-
tional Academies Press.
[9] Drury, Richard Toshiyuki, Michael E. Belliveau, J. Scott Kuhn and Shipra Bansal. 1999.
“Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air
Quality Policy.” Duke Environmental Law Policy Forum, 9(2): 233-289.
[10] Ellerman, A. Denny. 2006. “Are Cap-and-Trade Programs More Environmentally Eﬀec-
tive than Conventional Regulation?” Moving to Markets in Environmental Regulation:
Lessons from Twenty Years of Experience. Freeman, Jody and Charles Kolstad Eds.
Oxford University Press.
[11] Ellerman, A. Denny. 2003. “The U.S. SO2 Cap-and-Trade Program.” Proceedings of the
OECD Workshop on Ex Post Evaluation of Tradable Permits: Policy Evaluation and
Reform” Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.
[12] Ellerman, A. Denny, Paul L. Joskow, and David Harrison, Jr. 2003. “Emissions Trad-
ing in the U.S.: Experience, Lessons, and Considerations for Greenhouse Gases.” Pew
Center on Global Climate Change.
36[13] Executive Order 12898. 1994. “Federal Actions To Address Environmental Justice in
Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations.”
[14] Freedman, David A. and R.A. Berk. 2008. “On weighting regressions by propensity
scores.” Evaluation Review 32: 392-409.
[15] Gangadharan, Lata. 2000. “Transaction Costs in Pollution Markets: An Empirical
Study.” Land Economics 76(4): 601-614.
[16] GAO. 1983. Siting of Hazardous Waste Landﬁlls and Their Correlation with Racial and
Economic Status of Surrounding Communities. Washington, D.C.
[17] Green, Kenneth P., Steven F. Hayward and Kevin A. Hassett. 2007. “Climate Change:
Caps vs. Taxes.” Environmental Policy Outlook. American Enterprise Institute for Pub-
lic Policy Research June 2007.
[18] Hall, Jane V., Arthur M. Winer, Michael T. Kleinman, Frederick W. Lurmann, Victor
Brajer, and Steven D. Colome. 1992. “Valuing the Health Beneﬁts of Clean Air.” Science
255(5046): 812-817.
[19] Harrington, Winston, Richard D. Morgenstern, Thomas Sterner, and J. Clarence (Terry)
Davies. 2004. “Lessons from the Case Studies” in Choosing Environmental Policy: Com-
paring Instruments and Outcomes in the United States and Europe Winston Harrington,
Richard D. Morgenster, and Thomas Sterner, eds., RFF Press, Washington, DC.
[20] Harrington, Winston and Richard D. Morgenstern. 2007. “Economic Incentives Versus
Command and Control: What’s the Best Approach for Solving Environmental Prob-
lems?” Acid in the Environment: Lessons Learned and Future Prospects.G e r a l dR .
Visgilio and Diana M. Whitelaw, eds. Springer. US.
[21] Heckman, J. 1979. "Sample selection bias as a speciﬁcation error." Econometrica,4 7 ,
153—61.
[22] Heckman, James, Hidehiko Ichimura and Petra Todd. 1997. “Matching As An Econo-
metric Evaluation Estimator: Evidence from Evaluating a Job Training Program,” Re-
view of Economic Studies, 64(4): 605-654.
[23] Heckman, James, Hidehiko Ichimura, Jeﬀrey Smith, and Petra Todd. 1998. “Charac-
terizing Selection Bias Using Experimental Data.” Econometrica, 66(5): 1017-1098.
[24] Holland, P. 1986. "Statistics and causal inference". Journal of the American Statistical
Association 81, 945—70.
[ 2 5 ]H o l l a n d ,S t e p h e nP .a n dM i c h a e lR .M o o r e .2 0 0 8 .“ W h e nt oP o l l u t e ,W h e nt oA b a t e ?
Intertemporal Permit Use in the Los Angeles NOx Market.” NBER WP no. 14254.
37[26] Kaswan, A. 2008. “Environmental Justice and Domestic Climate Change Policy.” En-
vironmental Law Reporter.
[27] Klier, Thomas H., Richard H. Mattoon, and Michael A. Prager. 1997. “A Mixed Bag:
Assessment of Market Performance and Firm Trading Behavior in the NOx RECLAIM
Programme.” Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 40(6): 751-774.
[28] Keohane, Nathaniel O., Erin T. Mansur, and Andrey Voynov. Forthcoming. “Averting
Regulatory Enforcement: Evidence from New Source Review,” Journal of Economics
and Management Strategy.
[29] Keohane, Nathaniel, Richard Revesz, and Robert Stavins. 1998. “The Choice of Regula-
tory Instruments in Environmental Policy,” Harvard Environmental Law Review, 22(2):
313-367.
[30] Kolstad, Jonathan and Frank Wolak. 2003. “Using Environmental Emissions Permit
Prices to Raise Electricity Prices: Evidence from the California Electricity Market,”
CSEM Working Paper 113.
[31] Moore, Curtis A. 2004. “RECLAIM: Southern California’s Failed Experiment With Air
Pollution Trading.” Clean Air Trust http://www.cleanairtrust.org/release.121902.html,
http://www.cleanairtrust.org/pdf/reclaim.pdf.
[32] Morello-Frosch, Rachel, Manuel Pastor, and James Sadd. 2001. “Environmental Justice
and Southern California’s ‘Riskscape’: The Distribution of Air Toxics Exposures and
H e a l t hR i s k sa m o n gD i v e r s eC o m m u n i t i e s . ”Urban Aﬀairs Review 36: 551-578.
[33] Morgan, Stephen L. and David J. Harding. 2006. “Matching Estimators of Causal Ef-
fects: Prospects and Pitfalls in Theory and Practice.” Sociological Methods & Research
35(1): 3-60.
[34] Robins, J.M. and Ritov, Y. 1997. "Towards a curse of dimensionality appropriate
(CODA) asymptotic theory for semi-parametric models." Statistics in Medicine. 16:285-
310.
[35] Robins J.M., Rotnitzky A and Zhao L.P. Analysis of Semiparametric Regression-Models
for Repeated Outcomes in the Presence of Missing Data. Journal of the American Sta-
tistical Association, 1995; 90(429): 106-121.
[36] Rosenbaum, P. R. and D. B. Rubin. 1983. “The central role of the propensity score in
observational studies for causal eﬀects.” Biometrika 70(1): 41-55.
[37] Schubert, U. and A. Zerlauth. 1999. “Air quality management systems in urban re-
gions: The case of the emission trading programme RECLAIM in Los Angeles and its
transferability to Vienna,” in Environment and Health.
38[38] South Coast Air Quality Management District. 1998. Three Year Audit and Progress
Report, Diamond Bar, California.
[39] SCAQMD. 2000. Review of RECLAIM Findings. Diamond Bar, California.
[40] SCAQMD. 2001. White Paper on Stabilization of NOx RTC Prices. Diamond Bar, Cal-
ifornia.
[41] SCAQMD. 2002. “Comments on Draft Report ‘An Evaluation of the South Coast Air
Quality Management District’s Regional Clean Air Incentives Market- Lessons in Envi-
ronmental Market and Innovation’”Diamond Bar, California.
[42] SCAQMD. Various years. Annual RECLAIM Audit Report. Published annually be-
ginning with compliance year 1994. Diamond Bar, California.
[43] SCAQMD. 2007. Over a Dozen Years of RECLAIM Implementation: Key Lessons
Learned in California’s First Air Pollution Cap-and-Trade Program. Diamond Bar, Cal-
ifornia.
[44] Shadbegian, Ronald, Wayne Gray and Cynthia Morgan. 2007. “Beneﬁts and Costs
From Sulfur Dioxide Trading: A Distributional Analysis” in Acid in the Environment :
Lessons Learned and Future Prospects. Gerald R. Visgilio and Diana M. Whitelaw Eds.
Springer.
[45] Shapiro, M. (2005). Equity and Information: Information Regulation, Environmental
Justice, and Risks from Toxic Chemicals. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management,
24(2), 373—398.
[46] Smith, Jeﬀrey and Petra Todd. 2005. “Does Matching Overcome Lalonde’s Critique of
Nonexperimental Estimators?” Journal of Econometrics, 125 (1-2): 305-353.
[47] Stavins, Robert N. 1998. “What Can We Learn from the Grand Policy Experiment?
Positive and Normative Lessons from SO2 Allowance Trading.” Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 12(3): 69-88.
[48] Stavins, Robert N. 2007. “A U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Global Climate
Change” KSG Working Paper No. RWP07-052.
[49] Tietenberg, Tom H. 2006. Emissions Trading Principles and Practice. Resources for the
Future. Washington D.C.
[50] US EPA. 1992. “The United States Experience with Economic Incentives to Control
Environmental Pollution.” Washington. D.C.
[51] US EPA. 2001. “The United States Experience with Economic Incentives for Protecting
the Environment.” Washington, D.C.
39[52] US EPA. 2002. An Evaluation of the South Coast Air Quality Management District’s
Regional Clean Air Incentives Market- Lessons in Environmental Market and Innova-
tion. Washington, D.C.
[53] US EPA. 2005. “The Acid Rain Program and Environmental Justice: Staﬀ Analysis.”
Washington, D.C.
[54] US EPA. 2006. “An Overview of the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market.” Washing-
ton, D.C.
[55] Vandenbergh, M.P. and B.A. Ackerly. 2006. “Climate Change: The Equity Problem.”
Virginia Environmental Law Journal,2 6 .
40  41
Figures and Tables 
 
 
Figure 1: The South Coast Air Quality Management District. 
 
 
Figure 2: Trends in Nitrogen Oxides Emissions (blue), Allocations (red), and Permit Price (green).   42
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Figure 3: Total NOx Emissions in RECLAIM and in the rest of California.  
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Figure 4: Average Cumulative Treatment Effect by Year (relative to Period 1 emissions), matching 
m=3. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of NOx Emissions. 
 
 
Period RECLAIM Control Total
 
Period 1  101.8 87.8 89.8
(1990-1993) (304.4) (394.0) (382.4)
      
Period 2  62.7 67.7 67.0
(1997-1998) (179.8) (338.4) (320.5)
      
Period 3  43.8 57.4 55.5
(2001-2002) (125.4) (309.6) (290.5)
      
Period 4  30.8 44.9 42.9
(2004-2005) (117.1) (265.0) (249.3)
 
Notes: We report the summary statistics on the balanced sample of facilities with positive 
emissions in all four periods. For RECLAIM facilities, this includes both those that 
complied with the regulation as well as those that did not. We report the mean tons of 
NOx emissions per facility (e.g., 101.8) as well as the standard deviation 304.4). There 
are 213 facilities in RECLAIM and 1273 in the control group. The control group is 
restricted to facilities located in counties that, during 1990 and 1993, were not in 
attainment with the 1-hour ozone NAAQS standards.       
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Major Industries. 
 
   RECLAIM    Treatment      Control  
Industry  SIC Share  obs min mean max  obs min mean max
Petroleum  Refining  2911 37.5% 10 9.8 880 2492 17 1.1 1046 4685
Electric  Services  4911 23.9% 21 5.3 378 1370 82 0.1 407 5545
Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas  1311 7.1%  10 8.4 116 374  154 0.1 83 1945
Cement,  Hydraulic  3241 4.1% 2 55.4 699 1342 9 501.4 1885 2978
Glass  Containers  3221 3.8% 1 611.1 611 611 5 287.9 856 1169
Natural Gas Trans. and Distribution  4923 2.3%  8 7.0 85 214  4 8.9 474 1361
Paper  Mills  2621 1.8% 6 4.5 83 422 5 0.3 121 392
Electric and Other Services Combined  4931 1.6%  4 20.9 107 188  64 0.1 335 5545
National Security  9711 0.9%  3 48.1 81 129  29 0.5 68 453
Industrial Inorganic Chemicals, NEC  2819 0.9%  5 8.3 31 80  10 0.3 223 2166
Steel Works, Blast Furnaces  3312 0.9%  3 5.7 103 237  4 2.3 20 74
Steam and Air-Conditioning Supply  4961 0.9%  7 6.6 39 108  2 16.0 55 94
Products of Petroleum and Coal, NEC  2999 0.8%  1 259.1 259 259  1 579.6 580 580
                 
Total for Major Industries     87%   81 4.5 281 2492   386 0.1 296 5545
 
Notes:  “RECLAIM Share” is the 4-digit SIC industry share of initial, period 1 NOx emissions. Most of the electric services did not comply (86% 
of the initial emissions). For facilities with positive emissions, we also report the summary statistics of tons of NOx emissions during 
period 1 for both treated and the control facilities. 
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Table 3: Change in Emissions (tons) per Capita by Demographic Group 
 
  Actual change    Relative change 
Group  0.5 miles     1 mile     2 miles       0.5 miles     1 mile     2 miles    
White, Low Income  -0.61  (0.30)**  -1.62 (0.64)**  -6.99 (2.22)*** -0.68  (0.39)*  -0.96 (0.66)  -4.27 (2.59) 
White, Middle Income  -0.21  (0.11)*  -1.45 (0.72)**  -8.48 (4.41)*  -0.02  (0.14)  -0.56 (0.38)  -3.37 (1.33)** 
White, High Income  -0.88  (0.58)  -3.12 (1.98)  -10.72 (5.34)**  -0.12  (0.19)  -0.97 (0.70)  -4.52 (2.12)** 
Black, Low Income  -0.38  (0.17)**  -2.08 (0.93)**  -15.26 (6.44)**  -0.38  (0.20)*  -1.61 (0.94)*  -12.30 (5.83)** 
Black, Middle Income  -0.21  (0.10)**  -1.39 (0.62)**  -14.34 (5.92)**  -0.07  (0.16)  -0.75 (0.53)  -9.08 (4.16)** 
Black, High Income  -0.33  (0.20)  -8.80 (7.57)  -27.13 (18.69)  -0.07  (0.09)  -6.43 (6.08)  -21.53 (15.03) 
Asian, Low Income  -0.90  (0.67)  -4.65 (3.34)  -17.20 (10.07)*  -0.59  (0.63)  -3.27 (2.88)  -12.11 (8.71) 
Asian, Middle Income  -0.20  (0.10)**  -1.99 (1.23)  -13.99 (8.58)  -0.06  (0.16)  -0.20 (0.44)  -3.06 (1.65)* 
Asian, High Income  -1.14  (0.91)  -3.57 (2.13)*  -14.13 (7.87)*  0.14  (0.22)  -0.76 (0.55)  -4.20 (1.82)** 
Hispanic, Low Income  -0.65  (0.27)**  -5.26 (1.89)*** -24.19 (8.05)*** -0.71  (0.37)*  -1.99 (2.27)  -10.57 (9.24) 
Hispanic, Middle Income  -0.33  (0.12)**  -1.63 (0.49)*** -12.56 (3.71)*** -0.02  (0.24)  -0.68 (0.57)  -5.77 (3.57) 
Hispanic, High Income  -0.77  (0.49)  -2.04 (1.11)*  -10.35 (4.07)**  -0.04  (0.13)  -0.48 (0.35)  -5.52 (2.40)** 
 
            
All Whites  -0.63  (0.32)*  -2.36 (1.16)**  -9.42 (3.81)**  -0.18  (0.13)  -0.84 (0.42)** -4.12 (1.39)***
All Blacks  -0.32  (0.10)*** -3.05 (1.56)*  -17.03 (7.98)**  -0.23  (0.12)** -2.19 (1.29)*  -12.93 (6.54)** 
All Asians  -0.77  (0.41)*  -3.29 (1.52)**  -14.82 (6.63)**  -0.10  (0.20)  -1.17 (0.78)  -5.71 (2.45)** 
All Hispanics  -0.55  (0.16)*** -3.46 (0.99)*** -17.88 (4.69)*** -0.36  (0.20)*  -1.29 (1.14)  -8.07 (5.19) 
All Low Income  -0.63  (0.26)**  -4.09 (1.49)*** -19.09 (6.09)*** -0.65  (0.33)*  -1.82 (1.66)  -9.63 (6.69) 
All Middle Income  -0.26  (0.10)**  -1.61 (0.61)**  -11.35 (4.37)**  -0.02  (0.18)  -0.58 (0.44)  -4.81 (2.28)** 
All High Income  -0.88  (0.58)  -3.22 (1.74)*  -11.85 (5.19)**  -0.06  (0.16)  -1.07 (0.64)  -5.38 (2.20)** 
 
            
Total -0.59  (0.21)*** -2.97 (0.87)*** -14.09 (3.74)*** -0.25  (0.14)*  -1.16 (0.63)*  -6.61 (2.82)** 
 
Notes:  Change in emissions from Period 2 to Period 3. Electric facilities are included. We denote significance with *** at the 1-percent level, ** at the 5-percent 
level, and * at the 10-percent level.    46
Table 4: Average Treatment Effect using Nearest Neighbors Matching. 
 
Panel A: Change in NOx Emissions between Periods 1 and 4. 
 
 Levels    Logs   
Method Coef. Std.Err.   Coef. Std.Err.   
            
OLS -38.14 (15.06)**  -0.37 (0.11)  *** 
            
Nearest Neighbor Matching  -17.79 (7.63)**  -0.25 (0.09) *** 
            
Propensity Score Matching  -24.81 (13.86)*  -0.27 (0.12) ** 
 
Panel B: Change in NOx Emissions between Periods 2 and 3 for Complying Facilities. 
 
 Levels    Logs   
Method Coef. Std.Err.   Coef. Std.Err.   
            
OLS -6.82 (6.66)  -0.23 (0.05)  *** 
            
Nearest Neighbor Matching  -9.42 (3.85)**  -0.26 (0.06) *** 
            
Propensity Score Matching  -14.78 (2.22)***  -0.26 (0.03) *** 
 
Period 1: average of positive emissions in 1990 and 1993 
Period 2: average of positive emissions in 1997 and 1998 
Period 3: average of positive emissions in 2001 and 2002 
Period 4: average of positive emissions in 2004 and 2005 
 
Notes:  The OLS estimates control for average NOx emissions during Period 1 (1990-1993) and 
four-digit SIC code indicator variables, with standard errors clustered by air basin. The 
nearest neighbor matching models match on historic emissions and four-digit SIC codes 
and use the preferred number of matches (see Table A3). The propensity score matching 
models match on historic emissions and two-digit SIC codes. For all models, the control 
group is restricted to facilities located in counties that, during 1990 and 1993, were not in 
attainment with the 1-hour ozone NAAQS standards. In Panel A, there are 212 treatment 
observations of the sample of 1523. For Panel B, there are 255 treated, which excludes 
the 13 facilities not complying with RECLAIM, of 1932. For the log specifications, 
emissions differences are defined as ln(EmitX+1)-ln(EmitY+1) and all matching is on 
ln(Emit1+1). We denote significance with *** at the 1-percent level, ** at the 5-percent 
level, and * at the 10-percent level. 
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Table 5: Indirect Test of Unconfoundedness. 
 
   Levels    Logs   
 Description  Coef. Std.Err.   Coef.  Std.Err.  
Change in NOx Emissions between Periods 1 and 4    
            
  Nearest Neighbor Matching  -0.91 (2.13)  -0.07  (0.06)  
            
  Propensity Score Matching  -3.03 (1.68)  -0.11  (0.04) ** 
          
Change in NOx Emissions between Periods 2 and 3 for Complying Facilities 
 
  Nearest Neighbor Matching  -0.76 (1.98)  0.08  (0.06)  
            
  Propensity Score Matching  -0.31 (1.51)  0.08  (0.03) ** 
 
Notes:  Treatment is L.A. facilities not in RECLAIM, but in the same four-digit SIC industries as 
in RECLAIM.   48
Table 6: Robustness to Control Group. 
 
Panel A: Change in NOx Emissions between Periods 1 and 4. 
   Levels   Logs   
  Description Coef. Std.Err.   Coef. Std.Err.   
Nearest Neighbor Matching   
 Exclude  L.A.  facilities  -20.86 (7.96)***  -0.34 (0.09)  *** 
              
  Northern CA only  -15.62 (6.04)**  -0.29 (0.11) ** 
              
 Southern  CA  only  -23.67 (7.58)***  -0.23 (0.11)  ** 
              
 Severe  Non-Attainment  only  -43.48 (9.74)***  -0.39 (0.13)  *** 
Propensity Score Matching            
 Exclude  L.A.  facilities  -29.63 (17.59)  -0.28 (0.12)  ** 
              
  Northern CA only  -23.79 (9.12)**  -0.17 (0.08) * 
              
 Southern  CA  only  -23.86 (27.68)  -0.30 (0.22)   
              
 Severe  Non-Attainment  only  -44.91 (25.67)  -0.33 (0.17)  * 
 
Panel B: Change in NOx Emissions between Periods 2 and 3 for Complying Facilities. 
   Levels   Logs   
  Description Coef. Std.Err.   Coef. Std.Err.   
Nearest Neighbor Matching   
 Exclude  L.A.  facilities  -9.04 (4.40)** -0.21 (0.07)  *** 
              
  Northern CA only  -4.89 (7.51)  -0.19 (0.07) *** 
              
 Southern  CA  only  -8.71 (3.90)** -0.28 (0.07)  *** 
              
 Severe  Non-Attainment  only  -10.49 (5.31)** -0.23 (0.09)  *** 
Propensity Score Matching            
 Exclude  L.A.  facilities  -17.25 (4.95)***  -0.24 (0.09)  ** 
              
  Northern CA only  -22.88 (6.78)**  -0.14 (0.11)  
              
 Southern  CA  only  -13.43 (1.71)***  -0.20 (0.06)   
              
 Severe  Non-Attainment  only  -19.77 (7.77)** -0.35 (0.04)  *** 
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Table 7: Environmental Justice Results from Emissions Trading  
 
LHS is Change in NOx Emissions from Period 2 to Period 3 for Compliant Firms 
 
Panel A: Nearest Neighbor Matching  
 1     2   3   4   5   6    7  
Treatment -6.70  ***  -7.51***  -7.22**  -7.66***  -7.81***  -7.82 **  -8.46*** 
 (1.43)    (2.21)  (2.45)  (1.90)  (2.00)  (2.91)   (2.26) 
Treat * Period 1 NOx  -0.06 ***          -0.07***  -0.07***      -0.07*** 
 (0.02)            (0.01)  (0.01)      (0.01) 
Treat * Income      -0.23      -0.15      -0.37   -0.47 
     (0.20)      (0.13)      (0.31)   (0.32) 
Treat * %Minority          0.03     -0.06  -0.11   -0.25 
         (0.09)     (0.07)  (0.15)   (0.19) 
Period 1 NOx  -0.35 ***  -0.34***  -0.34***  -0.37***  -0.37***  -0.34 ***  -0.37*** 
 (0.08)    (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.08)   (0.09) 
Income      0.22      0.16      0.29   0.31 
     (0.24)      (0.19)      (0.37)   (0.33) 
%Minority          -0.05      0.02  0.05   0.14 
         (0.10)      (0.09)  (0.17)   (0.17) 
R
2 0.64    0.63  0.62  0.64  0.64  0.63   0.64 
 
Panel B: Propensity Score Matching 
 1     2   3   4   5   6    7  
Treatment -12.02  ***  -19.74***  -18.67***  -16.52***  -16.64***  -18.55 ***  -16.91*** 
 (2.84)    (3.06)  (3.20)  (3.42)  (3.35)  (2.69)   (2.93) 
Treat * Period 1 NOx  -0.15 ***          -0.19***  -0.19***      -0.19*** 
 (0.04)            (0.05)  (0.05)      (0.05) 
Treat * Income      -0.18      -0.14      -0.02   -0.37 
     (0.31)      (0.23)      (0.50)   (0.35) 
Treat * %Minority          0.17     -0.05  0.16   -0.20 
         (0.10)     (0.10)  (0.22)   (0.16) 
Period 1 NOx  -0.08 *  -0.15***  -0.15***  -0.03  -0.03  -0.15 ***  -0.03 
 (0.04)    (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.04)   (0.05) 
Income      0.09      0.07      -0.04   0.13 
     (0.30)      (0.21)      (0.44)   (0.31) 
%Minority          -0.12      0.02  -0.13   0.06 
         (0.11)      (0.11)  (0.20)   (0.17) 
R
2  0.35   0.35 0.35 0.46 0.46 0.35   0.46 
 
Notes: For the nearest neighbor matching, there are 974 observations with demographic data. Group fixed 
effects are not shown. Weight control observations by control group size. For the propensity score 
matching, there are 1697 observations with demographic data and we do not show the two-digit SIC 
fixed effects. Significance is noted at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. %Minority is 
percent black or Hispanic. 
 
 
 
 
   50
Table 8: Environmental Justice Results from Overall RECLAIM Policy 
 
LHS is Change in NOx Emissions from Period 1 to Period 4 for All Firms 
 
Panel A: Nearest Neighbor Matching  
 1     2   3   4   5   6    7  
Treatment -20.64  **  -15.35**  -12.04**  -15.75**  -13.02**  -9.68 ***  -10.84** 
 (7.81)    (6.14)  (4.00)  (5.03)  (5.25)  (2.56)   (4.37) 
Treat * Period 1 NOx  -0.19           -0.11**  -0.10**      -0.10** 
 (0.11)            (0.04)  (0.04)      (0.04) 
Treat * Income      -0.45      -0.17      1.21   0.98 
     (0.57)      (0.59)      (1.01)   (0.91) 
Treat * %Minority          0.91*     0.61  1.35 *  0.96 
         (0.46)     (0.37)  (0.69)   (0.54) 
Period 1 NOx  -0.48 ***  -0.34***  -0.34***  -0.36***  -0.36***  -0.34 ***  -0.36*** 
 (0.11)    (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.06)   (0.06) 
Income      -0.21      -0.23      -0.97   -0.88 
     (0.54)      (0.50)      (0.93)   (0.84) 
%Minority          -0.39      -0.31  -0.73   -0.62 
         (0.29)      (0.29)  (0.52)   (0.48) 
R
2 0.90    0.93  0.93  0.93  0.93  0.93   0.93 
 
Panel B: Propensity Score Matching 
 1     2   3   4   5   6    7  
Treatment -20.11  **  -22.16**  -20.93**  -18.04**  -18.01**  -18.59 ***  -16.24*** 
 (8.23)    (9.55)  (8.91)  (6.25)  (6.51)  (6.08)   (4.99) 
Treat * Period 1 NOx  -0.12           -0.12  -0.11      -0.11 
 (0.10)            (0.09)  (0.09)      (0.09) 
Treat * Income      -0.28      -0.17      0.65   0.37 
     (0.33)      (0.37)      (0.80)   (0.63) 
Treat * %Minority          0.59**     0.36**  0.83   0.49 
         (0.25)     (0.13)  (0.51)   (0.33) 
Period 1 NOx  -0.61 ***  -0.69***  -0.68***  -0.62***  -0.62***  -0.68 ***  -0.62*** 
 (0.11)    (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.05)   (0.09) 
Income      -0.34      -0.32      -0.61   -0.47 
     (0.50)      (0.44)      (0.82)   (0.70) 
%Minority          -0.08      0.00  -0.30   -0.17 
         (0.14)      (0.11)  (0.41)   (0.33) 
R
2 0.87    0.89  0.89  0.89  0.89  0.89   0.89 
 
Notes: For the nearest neighbor matching, there are 829 observations with demographic data. Group fixed 
effects are not shown. Weight control observations by control group size. For the propensity score 
matching, there are 1396 observations with demographic data and we do not show the two-digit SIC 
fixed effects. Significance is noted at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. %Minority is 
percent black or Hispanic. 
 
 Appendices: Not for Publication
Appendix A: Emissions trends under the CAAAs
In 1990, Congress turned its attention to the widespread failure of US cities to attain health-
based national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS). Title I of the 1990 CAAAs sought
to address urban ozone problems in particular.40 T h er e q u i r e m e n t sf o rt h e9 6m e t r o p o l i t a n
areas failing to attain federal ozone standards were signiﬁcantly revised. Nonattainment
areas were reclassiﬁed according to the extent to which they exceeded federal standards.
Each classiﬁcation was subject to a diﬀerent deadline for achieving compliance. Figure A1
graphically illustrates the compliance requirements required under the CAAA for ﬁve air
basins in California. The dotted lines connect one hour ozone concentration values in 1990
(when the CAAAs were passed) with the Federal one hour standard (0.12 ppm) in the year in
which the air basin was required, under the auspices of the CAAA, to come into compliance.
Because SCAQMD was much further from attainment as compared to other air basins, the
district was given more time to comply.
The stronger unconfoundedness assumption described in Section 3.2 requires that the
control treatment resembles the regulations that RECLAIM facilities would have been sub-
jected to absent RECLAIM. To assess the plausibility of this assumption (albeit crudely)
we look at the ozone concentrations reductions mandated in SCAQMD vis a vis other Cal-
ifornia air basins over the study period. Figure A1 illustrates the compliance requirements
40Of all the criteria air pollutants regulated under the auspices of the Federal Clean Air Act, ground level
ozone has proven to be the most recalcitrant. Ozone is the primary constituent of smog. It is a highly
reactive compound that can damage the linings of the respiratory tract, reduce lung function, and aggravate
pre-existing respiratory conditions. In 1990, an estimated sixty percent of Americans lived in metropolitan
areas that were failing to meet Federal health-based ozone standards.
irequired under the CAAA for ﬁve air basins in California. The dotted lines connect one
hour ozone concentration values in 1990 (when the CAAAs were passed) with the Federal
one hour standard (0.12 ppm) in the year in which the air basin was required, under the aus-
pices of the CAAA, to come into compliance. The broken lines represent the more recently
required ozone concentration reduction trajectories that pertain to the federal 8-hour ozone
standard.41 The black lines (associated with the highest ozone concentrations) correspond
to the SCAQMD.
Because SCAQMD was much further from attainment as compared to other air basins,
the district was given more time to comply. Although ozone concentrations (and thus the
extent of non-attainment) in the South Coast signiﬁcantly exceed that of other California
non-attainment areas, mandated reductions follow similar–if not parallel–trajectories over
time. Figure A1 illustrates that mandated ozone concentration reduction trajectories were
similar across California’s non-attainment counties. This is consistent with, but certainly
not proof of, the hypothesis that regulations of NOx emissions from industrial sources in
SCAQMD and other non-attainment areas would have followed parallel paths over the time
period we study absent RECLAIM.
Appendix B: Ex post evaluation of the RECLAIM program
Evaluations of the RECLAIM program have been carried out by SCAQMD staﬀ (SCAQMD,
Various years), the United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA 2002; US
41In 1997, the EPA concluded that the 1-hour standard was inadequate for protecting pub-
lic health. The Agency issued a Federal 8-hour standard of 0.08 ppm which was oﬃcially up-
held by the courts in 2001. Deadlines for compliance with the 8-hour standard can be found at
http://www.epa.gov/ozonedesignations/regions/region9desig.htm.
iiEPA 2006), and academic researchers (Gangadharan, 2000; Schubert and Zerlauth, 1999).
Although these studies and reports arrive at diﬀerent conclusions, there is consensus that a
RECLAIM program evaluation is an important exercise:
How have actual emissions reductions [in RECLAIM] compared to those that
would have occurred under the subsumed CAC system? While there can be no
deﬁnitive answer, this question is so central to the aﬀected public in any area
contemplating converting from CAC to a trading based program that we are
obligated to try to answer it. (US EPA, 2002)
In the periodic program evaluations carried out by SCAQMD, the aggregate RTC permit
allocation serves as a proxy for counterfactual emissions. The authors maintain that this is
a reasonable, and potentially conservative estimate of counterfactual emissions because the
aggregate permit allocation was designed to track ex ante expected endpoint mass emissions
under the subsumed suite of CAC rules that were being ﬁercely opposed by industry. These
periodic evaluations routinely conclude that RECLAIM is achieving emissions reductions
equivalent, and possibly greater, than what would have been achieved under the subsumed
CAC measures.
A comprehensive EPA study (US EPA, 2002) argues that assumptions made during initial
projections for the RECLAIM program were “not valid predictors of real world behavior,”
nor were they substantiated with actual data (US EPA, 2002). Consequently, initial RTC
allocations are dismissed as invalid measures of counterfactual emissions. The authors allege
that RECLAIM has “produced far less emissions reductions than could have been expected
from the subsumed CAC system” (US EPA, 2002).42
42SCAQMD was quick to respond to allegations that their counterfactual emissions signiﬁcantly exceeded
that which could realistically have been expected under the subsumed CAC rules. This dispute was never
iiiUnresolved disagreements about what constitutes an appropriate measure of counterfac-
tual emissions has resulted in a plurality of opinions regarding RECLAIM’s overall perfor-
mance. Whereas the Deputy Executive Oﬃcer for the California Air Resources Board has
stated publicly that RECLAIM “hasn’t done as well as the regulations it replaced” (US EPA,
2006), a Pew Center report concludes that “the [RECLAIM] program’s ten-year phase-in de-
sign and trading provided the ﬂexibility that led to the achievement of environmental goals
that had been previously elusive.” (Ellerman et al., 2003).
Appendix C: Robustness to Estimates
This appendix tests the robustness of the main results. First we examine the overall match
quality (see Figure A2). In Table A1, we explore the robustness of our nearest neighbor
results in Table 4 to the bias adjustments we make using no correction, a linear correction,
and a quadratic correction. Patterns of coeﬃcient signiﬁcance are unaﬀected by the bias
adjustments.
For the observations used in Panel A of Table 8, Table A2 summarizes the demographic
data and other covariates we use to test the robustness of the environmental justice results.
These include: a variable measuring whether toxics were measured on site from the California
ARB’s Air Toxics “Hot Spots” Program (http://www.arb.ca.gov/AB2588/overview.htm);
annual county employment, payroll and establishments variables; an indicator of whether
the RECLAIM facility was located in the coastal zone with restricted permit access; and
resolved. A more recent, retrospective overview of the RECLAIM program published by the US EPA
concludes: “RECLAIM shows the critical nature of baseline credibility in a program’s perceived success or
failure”(US EPA, 2006).
ivindicators of two-digit SIC codes for major industries. When including these in the environ-
mental justice analysis, the only coeﬃcients for the treatment eﬀects that are signiﬁcant are
the average eﬀect, historic emissions, and petroleum reﬁning (which is positive).
Table A3 reports the robustness of the main nearest neighbors matching results to the
number of neighbors. For the overall eﬀect (period 1 to 4), the results are signiﬁcant and
qualitatively similar for 1, 2, or 3 neighbors. With more neighbors, the estimates are only
weakly signiﬁcant. For the trading eﬀects (period 2 to 3), the results are quite similar for 2,
3, 4, or 5 neighbors.
v  vi
Appendix Figures and Tables  
 
 
 
Figure A1: Required Ozone Concentration Reductions for Five Californian Air Basins. 
 
Notes:  This figure illustrates the ozone concentration reductions required of the five California air basins with the most severe air quality problems. Dotted lines 
connect an area's 1990 "design value" with the Federal 1- hour ozone standard in the year the basin is required to achieve compliance. A design value is an air 
quality measurement that is used to determine an area's air quality status (in reference to a National Ambient Air Quality Standard). Areas that had relatively high 
ozone concentrations in 1990 (and high design values) were given more time to come into attainment with the Federal standard. Compliance deadlines were 
established under the CAAA 1990. In 1997, the EPA issued a Federal 8-hour standard of 0.08 ppm. This standard was officially upheld by the courts in 2001. 
The broken lines connect an area's 8-hour design standard (measured in 2001) and the Federal 8-hour standard in the year the area must comply with this 
standard. Deadlines for compliance with the 8-hour standard can be found at http://www.epa.gov/ozonedesignations/regions/region9desig.htm. Historical data on 
ozone design values are available from California Air Resources Board: http://www.arb.ca.gov/adam/php_files/aqdphp/sc8start.php.   vii
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Figure A2: Match Quality for Overall Effect on Historic Emissions. 
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Figure A3: k-Nearest Neighbor Regression of Changes in Emissions from Period 1 to 
Period 4 in the RECLAIM and Control Groups on Period 1 Emissions. The 
sample is from the main results shown in Table 4.  viii
Table A1: Robustness to Bias Adjustment and Matching Method. 
 
Panel A: No Bias Adjustment 
  Levels   Logs       
Description of dependent variable  Coef. Std.Err.   Coef. Std.Err.     n  treat
Overall (Emit4-Emit1)  -25.02 (7.63)***  -0.32 (0.09) ***  1,745 215 
               
Trading (Emit3-Emit2)  -9.60 (3.85)**  -0.37 (0.08) ***  2,217 255 
 
Panel B: Linear Bias Adjustment 
  Levels   Logs       
Description of dependent variable  Coef. Std.Err.   Coef. Std.Err.     n  treat
Overall (Emit4-Emit1)  -20.59 (7.63)***  -0.27 (0.09) ***  1,745 215 
               
Trading (Emit3-Emit2)  -8.29 (3.85)**  -0.34 (0.08) ***  2,217 255 
 
Panel C: Quadratic Bias Adjustment (main specification) 
 Levels    Logs       
Description of dependent variable  Coef. Std.Err.   Coef. Std.Err.     n  treat
Overall (Emit4-Emit1)  -17.79 (7.63)**  -0.25 (0.09) ***  1,745 215 
               
Trading (Emit3-Emit2)  -9.42 (3.85)**  -0.31 (0.08) ***  2,217 255 
 
 
Notes:    EmitX is emissions in period X. All models match on the same variables as in Table 4. For the log 
specification, emissions differences are defined as ln(EmitX+1)-ln(EmitY+1) and all matching is 
on ln(Emit1+1). For each LHS variable, the preferred m from Table 4 is used. The kernel 
matching panel uses a bandwidth of 0.05. We denote significance with *** at the 1-percent level, 
** at the 5-percent level, and * at the 10-percent level. 
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Table A2: Demographic Summary Statistics 
 
Variables for RECLAIM facilities  n mean  std dev min max
median zip code income (in $1000s) in 1999  208 45.2  16.3 8.6 98.1
percent of zip code that is black or Hispanic (in 2000)  208 55.2  27.8 4.0 98.8
indicator of whether toxics were measured on site  208 29%  45% 0% 100%
% change in total county employment from period 1 to 4  208 23%  18% 11% 69%
% change in total county payroll from period 1 to 4  208 76%  30% 56% 153%
% change in total county establishments from period 1 to 4 208 17%  7% 13% 35%
Indicator of coastal permits  208 70%      
Petroleum  Refining  208 7%     
Stone, Clay, and Glass Products  208 9%      
Primary Metal Industries  208 9%      
Electric and Gas Services  208 16%      
 
Variables for control facilities  n mean  std dev min max
median zip code income (in $1000s) in 1999  621 45.9  15.4 17.9 120.1
percent of zip code that is black or Hispanic (in 2000)  621 46.7  26.5 3.1 100.0
indicator of whether toxics were measured on site  621 19%  39% 0% 100%
% change in total county employment from period 1 to 4  621 27%  17% 6% 123%
% change in total county payroll from period 1 to 4  621 94%  33% 56% 277%
% change in total county establishments from period 1 to 4 621 14%  8% -2% 60%
Indicator of coastal permits  621 0%      
Petroleum  Refining  621 9%     
Stone, Clay, and Glass Products  621 9%      
Primary Metal Industries  621 9%      
Electric and Gas Services  621 16%      
   x
Table A3: Robustness of Average Treatment Effect to Number of Nearest Neighbors. 
 
Dependent Variable: Change in NOx Emissions from Period X to Period Y 
 
Dependent variable  m(1)     m(2)    m(3)    m(4)     m(5)   
             
Overall (Emit4-Emit1)  -27.06 ***  -21.57***  -17.79**  -15.17 *  -15.09* 
  (8.74)   (8.07) (7.63) (7.81)   (8.10) 
Sum MSE  44.30   48.10  42.30 47.90   46.00 
Average percent change  -26%   -21%  -17%  -15%   -15% 
             
Trading (Emit3-Emit2)  -7.83   -9.64**  -9.42**  -9.38 **  -9.89** 
  (7.08)   (4.13) (3.85) (4.64)   (4.06) 
Sum MSE  17.44   15.13  14.48 15.31   16.02 
Average percent change  -16%   -20%  -20%  -19%   -20% 
 
Notes:  All matching models match on average NOx emissions during Period 1 (1990-1993) and 
four-digit SIC codes. In addition, the control group is restricted to facilities located in 
counties that, during 1990 and 1993, were not in attainment with the 1-hour ozone 
NAAQS standards. In the first row, the dependent variable is the change in NOx 
emissions from period 1 to period 4 (215 treatment observations of the sample of 2421). 
The second row is the change from period 2 to 3 (255 treated, excluding the 13 facilities 
not complying with RECLAIM, of 2217). m(#) specifies the number of matches to be 
made per observation. The sum of mean squared errors (in millions) is shown for each 
regression (see text for discussion of calculation). The preferred model is in bold. We 
denote significance with *** at the 1-percent level, ** at the 5-percent level, and * at the 
10-percent level. 
 